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Abstract—Imperfect secrecy in communication systems is
investigated. Instead of using equivocation as a measure of
secrecy, the distortion that an eavesdropper incurs in producing
an estimate of the source sequence is examined. The commu-
nication system consists of a source and a broadcast (wiretap)
channel, and lossless reproduction of the source sequence at
the legitimate receiver is required. A key aspect of this model
is that the eavesdropper’s actions are allowed to depend on the
past behavior of the system. Achievability results are obtained
by studying the performance of source and channel coding
operations separately, and then linking them together digitally.
Although the problem addressed here has been solved when
the secrecy resource is shared secret key, it is found that
substituting secret key for a wiretap channel brings new insights
and challenges: the notion of weak secrecy provides just as much
distortion at the eavesdropper as strong secrecy, and revealing
public messages freely is detrimental.
I. INTRODUCTION
There are a variety of ways to model the presence of
secrecy in a communication system. Shannon considered
the availability of secret key shared between the transmitter
(Alice) and receiver (Bob), using it to apply a one-time pad
to the message [1]. Wyner introduced the idea of physical-
layer security with the wiretap channel and secrecy capacity,
exploiting the difference in the channels to Bob and Eve (the
eavesdropper) [2]. Maurer derived secrecy by assuming that
Alice, Bob, and Eve have access to correlated random vari-
ables [3]. In such models, the measure of security is usually
the conditional entropy, or “equivocation”, of the message;
maximum equivocation corresponds to perfect secrecy.
In this work, we replace equivocation with an opera-
tionally motivated measure of secrecy. We want to design
our coding and encryption schemes so that if Eve tries to
reproduce the source sequence, she will suffer a certain level
of distortion. More precisely, the measure of secrecy is the
minimum average distortion attained by the cleverest (worst-
case) eavesdropper. Occasionally, we will refer to Eve’s
minimum average distortion as the payoff: Alice and Bob
want to maximize the payoff over all code designs.
This measure of secrecy has been considered previously by
Yamamoto in [4], but our setup differs from [4] in a few ways,
the most salient of which is “causal disclosure”. We assume
Bob, the legitimate receiver, is producing actions that are
revealed publicly (in particular, to Eve) in a causal manner.
We might view Eve as an adversary who is trying to predict
Bob’s current and future actions based on both the actions
Alice PY,Z|X
Bob
Eve
i = 1, . . . , n
Sn Xn
Y n
Zn
Ŝi
Ti
Ŝi−1
Fig. 1. Joint source-channel operations. Bob and Eve produce the sequences
Ŝn and Tn, respectively, after they receive the broadcast channel outputs. In
the ith step, Bob produces Ŝi, and Eve produces Ti based on her observation
of Zn and Ŝi−1.
that she has already witnessed and the output of her wiretap,
and subsequently act upon her predictions (see Figure 1).
To further motivate the causal disclosure feature of our
model, consider the effect of removing it; that is, consider Ya-
mamoto’s problem in [4]. Alice must communicate a source
sequence losslessly to Bob over a noiseless channel and
the secrecy resource is shared secret key. Eve observes the
message but is not given causal access to Bob’s reproduction
sequence. As shown in [5], the solution to this problem is
that any positive rate of secret key is enough to cause Eve
unconditionally maximal distortion – we see that secrecy is
alarmingly inexpensive. Similarly, if the secrecy resource is
physical-layer security instead of shared secret key, it can
be shown that a positive secrecy capacity is enough to force
maximal distortion. However, with causal disclosure in play
a tradeoff between secrecy capacity and payoff emerges. As
a side remark, one might observe that causal disclosure is
consistent with the spirit of Kerckhoffs’s principle [6].
In addition to assuming causal disclosure, we further
diverge from [4] by considering the presence of a wiretap
channel instead of shared secret key; the problem of shared
secret key with causal disclosure was solved in [7]. In [7], it
was found that the optimal tradeoff between the rate of secret
key and payoff earned is achieved by constructing a message
that effectively consists of a fully public part and a fully
secure part. More specifically, the optimal encoder publicly
reveals a distorted version of the source sequence and uses
the secret key to apply a one-time pad to the supplement.
With this insight, we use the broadcast channel to effectively
create two separate channels – one public and one secure –
as is done in [8]. However, we modify [8] by removing
the requirement that Eve must decode the public message,
thereby rendering the message public only in intention, not
in reality. We show that freely giving the “public” mes-
sage away dramatically decreases Eve’s distortion; thus, her
equivocation of the public message becomes important. Upon
using channel coding to transform the broadcast channel into
effective public and secure channels, we show that the weak
secrecy provided by the channel encoder allows us to use the
source code from [7] to link the source and channel coding
operations together digitally. It turns out that a strong secrecy
guarantee would not improve the results. Separation allows
us to obtain a lower bound on the achievable payoff. We also
provide an example of the lower bound and obtain an upper
bound. Most of the proofs are omitted.
Before proceeding, we briefly juxtapose our measure of
secrecy with equivocation. Equivocation does not give much
insight into the structure of Eve’s knowledge and does not
depend on the actions that Eve makes. In contrast, looking at
Eve’s distortion tells us something about the quality of her
reconstruction if her aim is to replicate a source sequence and
produce actions accordingly. There are other instances in the
literature where an operational definition of security is used.
For example, in [9], Merhav et al. looked at the expected
number of guesses needed to correctly identify a message.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
The system under consideration, shown in Figure 1, op-
erates on blocks of length n. All alphabets are finite, and
both the source and channel are memoryless. The commu-
nication flow begins with Alice, who observes a sequence
Sn, i.i.d. according to PS , and produces an input Xn to
the broadcast channel. The memoryless broadcast channel is
characterized by PY,Z|X , but since the relevant calculations
only involve the marginals PY |X and PZ|X , we need only
consider PY,Z|X = PY |XPZ|X . At one end of the channel,
Bob receives Y n and generates a sequence of actions, Sˆn,
with the requirement that the block error probability be small.
At the other terminal of the channel, Eve receives Zn and
generates T n; in generating Ti, she has access to the full
Zn sequence and the past actions of Bob, Sˆi−1. In essence,
we can view Bob and Eve as playing a public game that
commences after they receive the channel outputs. In each
move, they are allowed to see each other’s past moves and
produce an estimate of the next source symbol accordingly.
Since Bob’s reproduction must be almost lossless, his moves
are restricted and he does not benefit from knowing Eve’s
past actions. For similar reasons, revealing Sˆi−1 to Eve at
step i has exactly the same consequences as revealing Si−1;
henceforth, we consider the causal disclosure to be Si−1. A
more general version of the game would allow for distortion
in Bob’s estimate (see [10]), but in this work we focus on
lossless communication.
In the next two definitions, refer to Figure 1 for an
illustration of the setup.
Definition 1. For blocklength n, a source-channel code
consists of an encoder f and a decoder g:
f : Sn → Xn (more generally, PXn|Sn )
g : Yn → Sn.
Note that we do not restrict the encoder to be deterministic.
For any source-channel code, we can calculate the proba-
bility of block error and the payoff earned against the worst-
case adversary, as defined in the following:
Definition 2. Fix a value function (or, distortion measure)
pi : S ×T → [0,∞). We say that a payoff Π is achievable if
there exists a sequence of source-channel codes such that
lim
n→∞
P[Sn 6= Sˆn] = 0 (1)
and
lim
n→∞
min
{ti(si−1,zn)}i
E
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
pi(Si, ti(S
i−1, Zn))
]
≥ Π.
(2)
Eve’s average distortion, i.e. the LHS of (2), is defined
exactly as in rate-distortion theory for separable distortion
measures. Although it is not explicit in (2), we assume that
Eve has full knowledge of the source-channel code and the
source distribution PS .
III. LOWER BOUND
The first result is a lower bound on the maximum achiev-
able payoff.
Theorem 1. Fix PS , PY,Z|X , and pi(s, t). A payoff Π is
achievable if the inequalities
I(S;U) < I(V ;Y )
H(S|U) < I(W ;Y |V )− I(W ;Z|V )
Π ≤ min
t(u)
E[pi(S, t(U))]
hold for some distribution PSPU|SPV PW |V PX|WPY,Z|X .
Theorem 1 is obtained in part by transforming (via channel
coding) the noisy broadcast channel into noiseless public and
secure channels. However, the result can be strengthened
considerably by taking into account Eve’s equivocation of
the public message. The source-channel code used to achieve
Theorem 1 remains the same; only the analysis is strength-
ened. We illustrate and discuss this further in section IV,
where we give a brief proof sketch. Our main result is the
following theorem.
Theorem 2. Fix PS , PY,Z|X , and pi(s, t). A payoff Π is
achievable if the inequalities
I(S;U) < I(V ;Y )
H(S|U) < I(W ;Y |V )− I(W ;Z|V )
Π ≤ α ·Πmax + (1− α) ·min
t(u)
E[pi(S, t(U))]
fc PY,Z|X
gcMp
Ms
Xn
Y n
Zn
M̂p
M̂s
Fig. 2. Channel coding operations.
hold for some distribution PSPU|SPV PW |V PX|WPY,Z|X ,
where
Πmax = min
t
E[pi(S, t)]
and
α =
[I(V ;Y )− I(V ;Z)]+
I(S;U)
.
We obtain the lower bound in Theorem 2 by concatenating
a source code and a channel code and matching the rates
of the two codes. We first describe what constitutes a good
channel code, and the secrecy guarantees that come with it.
A. Channel Code
The channel code is made up of an encoder and decoder
as shown in Figure 2. The input to the encoder is a pair of
messages (Mp,Ms) destined for the channel decoder, with
Mp representing a public message and Ms a secure message.
The channel decoder outputs the pair (M̂p, M̂s). We allow
the channel encoder to use private randomization.
Definition 3. A (Rp, Rs, n) channel code consists of a
channel encoder fc and channel decoder gc:
fc :Mp ×Ms → Xn (more generally, PXn|Mp,Ms)
gc : Yn →Mp ×Ms,
where |Mp| = 2nRp and |Ms| = 2nRs .
Keeping in mind criteria (1) and (2) and our desire to form
public and private channels, we might ask: what constitutes
a good channel code? First, the legitimate channel decoder
must recover Mp and Ms with vanishing probability of
error. Second, we need a guarantee that we have indeed
created a private channel. Ideally, we want to guarantee
that the a priori distribution on Ms matches the a pos-
teriori distribution given both Zn and Mp. If this holds,
we are assured that even if the adversary is able to view
the public channel perfectly (i.e., recover Mp), his optimal
strategy for determining Ms is to choose a random message
according to the a priori distribution PMs . Later we will
exploit the adversary’s inability to exactly recover Mp, but
for now we suppose that it is freely available. We turn
to the notion of secrecy capacity and cast our requirement
in terms of entropy: we want H(Ms) ≈ H(Ms|Zn,Mp),
or I(Ms;Z
n,Mp) ≈ 0. More precisely, the normalized
mutual information 1
n
I(Ms;Z
n,Mp) should vanish in a good
channel code. Although this measure of secrecy is so-called
“weak secrecy”, it turns out that having strong secrecy would
not improve the payoff for the source encoder that we use.
We make a further technical requirement (c.f. [8]) that
good channel codes must satisfy for our purposes, consider-
ing the particular source encoder that we employ. The channel
code must work not only for (Mp,Ms) independent and
uniformly distributed, but more generally in the case that,
conditioned on Mp, Ms is almost uniform. To be precise,
we require
max
mp,ms,m′s
P[Ms = ms|Mp = mp]
P[Ms = m′s|Mp = mp]
≤ 2n·δn (3)
to hold for some δn such that δn → 0 as n → ∞.
The source encoder we employ will produce message pairs
(Mp,Ms) that satisfy this condition, regardless of the source
distribution.
Definition 4. The pair of rates (Rp, Rs) is achievable if,
for all (Mp,Ms) satisfying (3) for every n, there exists a
sequence of (Rp, Rs, n) channel codes such that
lim
n→∞
P[(Mp,Ms) 6= (M̂p, M̂s)] = 0
and
lim
n→∞
1
n
I(Ms;Z
n,Mp) = 0.
The following theorem gives an achievable region, the
proof of which comes from modifying the work done in
[8]. The idea is to include enough private randomness in the
channel encoder so that the adversary effectively uses his full
decoding capabilities to resolve the randomness, leaving no
room to additionally decode part of the secret message. The
amount of randomness required is the mutual information
provided by the adversary’s channel.
Theorem 3. The pair (Rp, Rs) is achievable if
Rp < I(V ;Y ),
Rs < I(W ;Y |V )− I(W ;Z|V )
for some PV PW |V PX|WPY Z|X .
B. Source Code
A source code consists of a source encoder and decoder.
The encoder observes a memoryless source PS and produces
a pair of messages, (Mp,Ms), with Mp representing a public
message and Ms a secure message. We allow the source
encoder to use private randomization.
Definition 5. A (Rp, Rs, n) source code consists of an
encoder fs and a decoder gs:
fs : Sn →Mp ×Ms (more generally, PMp,Ms|Sn)
gs :Mp ×Ms → Sn,
where |Mp| = 2nRp and |Ms| = 2nRs .
As shown in Figure 3, the output of the source encoder is
effectively passed through a channel PZn|Mp,Ms . In light of
the previous subsection, we want to consider sequences of
channels {PZn|Mp,Ms}∞n=1 that provide weak secrecy when
the output of the source encoder satifies (3).
fs gs
PZn|MpMs
Sn
Mp
Ms
Sˆn
Zn
Fig. 3. Source coding operations.
Definition 6. Define CS to be the set of {PZn|Mp,Ms}∞n=1
such that, for all PMp,Ms satisfying (3) for every n,
1
n
I(Ms;Z
n|Mp)→ 0.
We can view CS as the resource of physical-layer security.
Notice that a sequence of good channel codes yields a
sequence of channels in CS to the adversary. We now
consider what payoff can be achieved if rates are imposed
on the messages, and CS is imposed. By considering the
availability of a structure CS and a noiseless channel from
Alice to Bob, we are effectively divorcing the goals of source
and channel coding so that each can be considered separately.
Definition 7. Fix PS and pi(s, t). The triple (Rp, Rs,Π) is
achievable if there exists a sequence of (Rp, Rs, n) source
codes such that
lim
n→∞
P[Sn 6= Sˆn] = 0, (4)
(Mp,Ms) satisfies (3) ∀n, (5)
and, for all {PZn|Mp,Ms}∞n=1 ∈ CS ,
lim
n→∞
min
{ti(si−1,zn)}i
E
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
pi(Si, ti(S
i−1, Zn))
]
≥ Π.
(6)
We give a region of achievable (Rp, Rs,Π). In [7], the
region is characterized when the secrecy resource is shared
secret key instead of physical-layer security.
Theorem 4. Fix PS and pi(s, t). Then (Rp, Rs,Π) is achiev-
able if the inequalities
Rp > I(S;U)
Rs > H(S|U)
Π ≤ min
t(u)
E[pi(S, t(U))]
hold for some PSPU|S .
The lower bound in Theorem 1 follows from Theorems 3
and 4. The main idea in the proof of Theorem 4 is to
use the public message to specify a sequence Un that is
correlated with Sn, and use the secure message to encode
the supplement that is needed to fully specify the source
sequence. The source encoder is defined in such a way that,
conditioned on the public message Mp, the adversary views
the source as if it were generated by passing Un through
a memoryless channel PS|U . With this perspective, the past
Si−1 will no longer help the adversary; Eve’s best strategy
is to choose a function t that maps Ui to Ti.
Although we omit the full proof of Theorem 4, we provide
the crucial lemma that shows how the weak secrecy provided
by a good channel code is used in analyzing the payoff.
The result of Lemma 1 (below) is that we can view Eve as
having full knowledge of Mp and Si−1 and no knowledge
of Ms, which fulfills our goal of creating a secure channel
and a public channel. In other words, using channel coding
to create physical-layer security in the form of a structure CS
allows us to show that, from Eve’s perspective, knowledge
of (Zn, Si−1) is no more helpful than (Mp, Si−1) in easing
the distortion. To parse the statement of the lemma, simply
look at the arguments of t(·).
Lemma 1. If PMp,Ms satisfies (3) for every n, and
{PZn|Mp,Ms}∞n=1 ∈ CS , then for all ε > 0,
min
t(i,si−1,zn)
E
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
pi(Si, t(i, S
i−1, Zn))
]
≥ min
t(i,si−1,mp)
E
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
pi(Si, t(i, S
i−1,Mp))
]
− δ(ε)
for sufficiently large n, where δ(ε)→ 0 as ε→ 0.
Proof: Let ε > 0. Introduce the random variable
Q ∼ Unif[1 : n], independent of all other random variables
present. First, we have
I(SQ;Z
n|MpSQ−1Q)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
I(Si;Z
n|MpSi−1)
=
1
n
I(Sn;Zn|Mp)
≤ 1
n
I(MsS
n;Zn|Mp)
=
1
n
I(Ms;Z
n|Mp) + 1
n
I(Sn;Zn|MpMs)
=
1
n
I(Ms;Z
n|Mp)
≤ 1
n
I(Ms;Z
n,Mp)
< ε
for sufficiently large n, where the final inequality follows the
definition of CS . Next, denote P = PSQZnMpQ and define
the distribution
P = PMpSQ−1QPSQ|MpSQ−1QPZn|MpSQ−1Q.
That is, P is the markov chain SQ−MpSQ−1Q−Zn. Now,
using Pinsker’s inequality (see [11]), we have
‖P − P‖TV ≤ D(P‖P ) 12
= I(SQ;Z
n|MpSQ−1, Q) 12
<
√
ε, (7)
where ‖P −Q‖TV := supA |P (A)−Q(A)| is the variational
distance between distributions P and Q. Finally,
min
t(i,si−1,zn)
E
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
pi(Si, t(i, S
i−1, Zn))
]
≥ min
t(i,si−1,zn,mp)
E
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
pi(Si, t(i, S
i−1, Zn,Mp))
]
(8)
= min
t(i,si−1,zn,mp)
E
[
pi(SQ, t(Q,S
Q−1, Zn,Mp))
]
≥ min
t(i,si−1,zn,mp)
EP
[
pi(SQ, t(Q,S
Q−1, Zn,Mp))
] − δ(ε) (9)
= min
t(i,si−1,mp)
EP
[
pi(SQ, t(Q,S
Q−1,Mp))
]− δ(ε) (10)
≥ min
t(i,si−1,mp)
E
[
pi(SQ, t(Q,S
Q−1,Mp))
] − 2δ(ε) (11)
= min
t(i,si−1,mp)
E
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
pi(Si, t(i, S
i−1,Mp))
]
− 2δ(ε),
for sufficiently large n. The justification is as follows:
• (8): Give Eve Mp for free.
• (9): Change the underlying distribution from P to P by
using (7) and Lemma 3.
• (10): Use Lemma 2 since P is a markov chain.
• (11): Change the underlying distribution back to P .
Lemma 2 (Used in Lemma 1 proof). Let X,Y , and Z be
random variables that form a markov chain X − Y −Z and
let g be a function on A × Z . Define two sets of functions,
F = {f : X × Y → A} and F ′ = {f : Y → A}. Then
min
f∈F
E[g(f(X,Y ), Z)] = min
f∈F ′
E[g(f(Y ), Z)].
Proof omitted.
Lemma 3 (Used in Lemma 1 proof). Let f(x) be a bounded
function, and P and Q pmfs on X . Then
EP [f(X)]→ EQ[f(X)] as P TV−−→ Q
Proof of Lemma 3:
EP [f(X)]− EQ[f(X)]
=
∑
x∈X
(P (x)−Q(x))f(x)
≤ fmax
∑
x
|P (x)−Q(x)|
= 2 fmax‖P −Q‖TV .
IV. EXAMPLE
In this section, we give an analytical expression for the
region in Theorem 1 when the value function pi(s, t) is
Hamming distance and the broadcast channel is binary sym-
metric. We first consider the separate regions that we stated
for source coding and channel coding (i.e., Theorems 3 and
4), then we join the results. Finally, we use the example to
illustrate the difference between Theorems 1 and 2.
Denoting the region in Theorem 3 by R, we have the
following.
Theorem 5. For a binary symmetric broadcast channel with
PY |X = BSC(p1), PZ|X = BSC(p2), and p1 ≤ p2, we have
R=
⋃
0≤γ≤1
2
 (Rp, Rs) :Rp < 1− h(γ ∗ p1)
Rs < h(γ ∗ p1)− h(γ ∗ p1)− h(p1) + h(p2)

where h(·) is the binary entropy function.
The source coding achievability region in Theorem 4 is
given as a union of (Rp, Rs,Π) subregions, one subregion
for each choice of PU|S . However, once PU|S is fixed,
(Rp, Rs,Π) triples on the boundary satisfy Rp = H(S)−Rs,
so we restrict our attention to (Rs,Π) pairs. According to
Theorem 4, the boundary is given by
Π(Rs) = max
PU|S :
H(S|U)=Rs
min
t(u)
E[pi(S, t(U))]. (12)
When pi(s, t) is Hamming distance, we give an analytical
expression for (12).
Theorem 6. Fix PS and let pi(s, t) = 1{s6=t}. Define
the function f(R) as the linear interpolation of the points
(logn, n−1
n
), n = 1, 2, . . . and the function g(R) as the
constant 1−maxs PS(s). Then (12) is given by
ΠH(Rs) = min(f(Rs), g(Rs)).
We now use Theorems 5 and 6 to give an expression for
Theorem 1 when the value function is Hamming distance and
the broadcast channel is binary symmetric.
Theorem 7. With source PS , channels PY |X = BSC(p1)
and PZ|X = BSC(p2), and value function pi(s, t) = 1{s6=t},
an achievable payoff is
Π =

ΠH(h(γ ∗ p1)− h(γ ∗ p2)− h(p1) + h(p2))
if h(p2)− h(p1) < H(S) < 1− h(p1)
ΠH(H(S))
if H(S) ≤ h(p2)− h(p1)
where γ ∈ [0, 12 ] solves H(S) = 1−h(γ∗p2)−h(p1)+h(p2)
and ΠH(Rs) is as in Theorem 6.
Discussion of Theorem 2
When we established the lower bound in Theorem 1, we
did so with the structure of a public channel and secure
channel in mind; however, as mentioned, the public channel
may not be truly public. We made the assumption that the
adversary is freely given Mp; indeed, the proof of Lemma 1
illustrates this in (8), where we suffer a loss in our payoff
analysis by including Mp as an input to the adversary’s
strategy.
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Fig. 4. The result of Thm 7 with PS = Bern(p), p1 = 0, and p2 =
0.3. The “Theorem 1” curve is directly Thm 7 and “Theorem 2” is the
improvement to Thm 1. “Unconditional” is the payoff when Eve only knows
PS , while “No Encoding” refers to Xn = Sn.
We can strengthen the analysis of Theorem 1 by taking into
account the equivocation of the public message. For block-
length n, the equivocation of the public message vanishes at
a certain time k due to the adversary’s ongoing accumulation
of past source symbols Sˆk−1. Before time k, the payoff
is Πmax = mint E[pi(S, t)] (i.e., the unconditional payoff).
After time k, the payoff is as in Theorem 1. Denoting this
payoff by Π1, we can now achieve (Theorem 2)
Π2 =
k
n
Πmax +
(
1− k
n
)
Π1.
The ratio k
n
is found to be
k
n
≈ [I(V ;Y )− I(V ;Z)]
+
I(S;U)
.
Figure 4 shows the difference between Theorem 1 and Theo-
rem 2, as well as a comparison to the curves that correspond
to no encoding and unconditional payoff. Unconditional
payoff refers to the distortion that Eve suffers if her only
knowledge is the source distribution, and no encoding refers
to simply taking the source as the input to the channel and
bypassing the encoder. The example is for a Bernoulli source
with bias p. If we assume that Eve has full knowledge of
the public message, then we see that for, say, p = 0.4, the
distortion guaranteed by the weaker theorem is even worse
than if no encoding was used. This illustrates the importance
of Eve’s equivocation of the public message.
V. UPPER BOUND
The upper bound is established by using ideas from the
converses in [7] and [8].
Theorem 8. Fix PS , PY Z|X , and pi(s, t). If a payoff Π is
achievable, then the inequalities
H(S) ≤ I(W ;Y )
H(S|U) ≤ [I(W ;Y |V )− I(W ;Z|V )]+
Π ≤ min
t(u)
E[pi(S, t(U))]
must hold for some distribution
PSPU|SPV PW |V PX|WPY Z|X .
VI. CONCLUSION
By considering source and channel operations separately,
we have given results on how well communication systems
can perform against a worst-case adversary when the secrecy
resource is physical-layer security and the adversary has
causal access to the source. We have seen that a guaran-
tee of weak secrecy can be used in conjunction with our
operationally-relevant measure of secrecy.
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